Inadvertent Escalation in the Age of Intelligence Machines : A new model for nuclear risk in the digital age by Johnson, James
 1 
Inadvertent Escalation in the Age of Intelligence Machines: A new model for nuclear 
risk in the digital age 
 
James Johnson 
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen, King's 
College, Aberdeen, AB24 3FX, United Kingdom 
 
Abstract: 
Will AI-enabled capabilities increase inadvertent escalation risk? This article revisits Cold 
War-era thinking about inadvertent escalation to consider how Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
technology (especially AI augmentation of advanced conventional weapons) through 
various mechanisms and pathways could affect inadvertent escalation risk between 
nuclear-armed adversaries during a conventional crisis or conflict. How might AI be 
incorporated into nuclear and conventional operations in ways that affect escalation risk? 
It unpacks the psychological and cognitive features of escalation theorizing (the security 
dilemma, the “fog of war,” and military doctrine and strategy) to examine whether and 
how the characteristics of AI technology, against the backdrop of a broader political-
societal dynamic of the digital information ecosystem, might increase inadvertent 
escalation risk. Are existing notions of inadvertent escalation still relevant in the digital 
age? The article speaks to the broader scholarship in international relations – notably 
“bargaining theories of war” – that argues that the impact of technology on the cause of 
war occurs through its political effects, rather than tactical or operational battlefield 
alterations. In this way, it addresses a gap in the literature about the strategic and 
theoretical implications of the AI-nuclear dilemma. 
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Introduction: 
How might AI-enabled capabilities increase inadvertent escalation risk? This article 
revisits Cold War-era thinking about inadvertent escalation to consider how artificial 
intelligence (AI) technology 1  (especially AI augmentation of advanced conventional 
counterforce weapons) through different mechanisms and pathways might influence 
 
1 Artificial intelligence (AI) is an umbrella concept that describes a broad portfolio of applications that 
enable machines to emulate human intelligence capabilities, such as language, reasoning, learning, 
heuristics, and observation. Recent progress in AI falls into two distinct fields: (1) “narrow” AI, which 
refers to involves statistical algorithms that learn procedures by analyzing large training datasets designed 
to approximate and replicate human cognitive tasks; and (2) “general” AI, which refers to AI with the 
scale and fluidity akin to the human brain. Narrow AI is already used in the private sector, particularly in 
data-rich research fields and applied sciences (e.g., predictive analytics for market research, consumer 
behavior, logistics, and quality control systems). Other emerging security-related technologies that AI 
machine-learning techniques might enable or be enhanced include autonomous weapons, robotics, 3D 
additive printing, quantum computing, 5G networks, semiconductors, and cyberspace. On AI, see Stuart 
Armstrong, Kaj Sotala, and Seán S. ÓhÉigeartaigh, “The Errors, Insights, and Lessons of Famous AI 
Predictions – and What They Mean for the Future,” Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial 
Intelligence 26:3 (2014), pp. 317-42. On related technologies, see Reuben Steff, Simone Soare, and Joe 
Burton ed, Emerging Technologies and International Security: Machines, the State and War, (London, 
UK: Routledge, 2020); and Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang, and Caitlin Talmadge, “Emerging technologies 
and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:6 (2019), pp. 727-
735. 
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inadvertent escalation risk between nuclear-armed adversaries during a conventional 
crisis or conflict. Are existing notions of inadvertent escalation still relevant in the digital 
age? We are now in an era of rapid disruptive technological change, especially in AI 
technology.2 AI technology is already being infused into military machines, and global 
armed forces are well advanced in their planning, research and development, and in some 
cases, deployment of AI-enabled capabilities. 3  Therefore, the embryonic journey to 
reorient military forces to prepare for the future digitized battlefield is no longer merely 
speculation or science fiction.  
 While much of the recent discussion has focused on specific technical issues and 
uncertainties involved as militaries developed and diffuse AI applications at the tactical 
and operational level of war, the strategic and theoretical treatment of these developments 
(or the “AI-nuclear strategic nexus) has received far less attention.4 This article addresses 
this gap. It examines the psychological and cognitive features of escalation theorizing to 
consider whether and how AI technology “characteristics,” 5  contextualized with the 
broader political dynamics associated with today's digital information ecosystem, may 
increase inadvertent escalation risk. It explains how AI technology could be incorporated 
into nuclear and conventional operations in ways that affect inadvertent escalation risks 
during a crisis or sub-nuclear conflict in strategically competitive dyads – US-China, 
India-Pakistan, and US-Russia. How might AI be incorporated into nuclear and 
conventional operations in ways that affect escalation risk? 
 The article speaks to the broader scholarship in international relations – notably 
“bargaining theories of war” (shifts in the balance of power, uncertainty, asymmetric 
 
2 See, James Johnson, “Artificial intelligence & future warfare: implications for international security,” 
Defense & Security Analysis, 35:2 (2019), pp. 147-169. 
3 See, Vincent Boulanin et al., Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk (SIPRI Report, 
June 2020). 
4 Notable exceptions include: Kenneth Payne, “Artificial Intelligence: A Revolution in Strategic Affairs?” 
Survival 60:5 (2018), pp. 7-32; Michael C. Horowitz, “When Speed Kills: Lethal Autonomous Weapon 
Systems, Deterrence and Stability,” Journal of Strategic Studies 42:6 (2019), pp. 764-88; Mark 
Fitzpatrick, “Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Command and Control,” Survival 61:3 (2019), pp. 81-92; 
Michael C. Horowitz et al., “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,” Artificial 
Intelligence and International Security (Center for New American Security), July 2018; and James 
Johnson, Artificial Intelligence & the Future of Warfare: USA, China, and Strategic Stability (Manchester 
University Press, 2021). 
5 AI technology “characteristics” refers to specific technical attributes of artificial intelligence that directly 
impacts escalation dynamics in a military context, including: brittleness, ‘explanability’ (or “black box” 
features), bias, machine-speed, and vulnerability. See, “No. 6 The Weaponization of Increasingly 
Autonomous Technologies: Concerns, Characteristics, and Definitional Approaches – a primer,” United 




information, and commitment problems), 6  deterrence theorizing, 7  and political 
psychology8 – that argues that the impact of technology on the cause of war occurs 
through its political and psychological effects, rather than tactical or operational 
battlefield shifts caused by technological innovation. Specifically, the political 
consequences that flow from changes to the balance of power and its impact on the 
redistribution of resources and perceived (by beneficiaries and their rivals) strategic 
advantage of utilizing a particular capability.9 A new asymmetric capability, doctrine, or 
strategy that decreases (or increases) the perceived cost, risk, and lethality of warfare, 
ceteris paribus, should affect the observable mechanisms of conflict such as escalation, 
only to the extent that it changes actors’ perceptions about how adversaries might perform 
in battle. Because of the centrality of information (i.e., capabilities, interests, and 
intentions), the critical factor is to what degree a particular technology disproportionality 
affects states' perception of the balance of power.10  
 The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, the article offers a 
conceptual overview of escalation theorizing. It defines the various terms, analogies, 
mechanisms, and metaphors associated with escalation, which describes at its core is a 
fundamentally psychological and perceptual one. Second, it applies Barry Posen’s 
inadvertent escalation analytical framework to examine the effects of AI technology on 
the causes of inadvertent escalation – that is, the “security dilemma,” the Clausewitzian 
 
6 See, for example, James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49:3 
(1995), pp. 379-414; Robert Powell, "War as a Commitment Problem," International Organization 60, no. 1 
(2006), pp. 169-203; Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in 
the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1981); and Robert Powell, In the Shadow 
of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999). 
7 See, for example, Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (New York, NY: Polity, 2004); Lawrence Freedman, 
The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003); Thomas Schelling, Arms and 
Influence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966); Glen H. Snyder, Deterrence and 
Defense: Towards a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961); and 
Partick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Michael 
Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects (Oxford: Oxford, University 
Press 2009). 
8 See, for example, Anthony C Lopez, Rose; McDermott, Petersen, and Michael Bang, "States in Mind: 
Evolution, Coalitional Psychology, and International Politics," International Security 36:2 (2011), pp. 48–
83; Robert Jervis How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics, (New Jersey, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2017); Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, 
Emotions and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Janice G. Stein, 
“Building politics into psychology: the misperception of threat,” Political Psychology 9:2 (1988), pp. 45-
71. 
9 See, William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since AD 1000 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and Kier A. Lieber, War and the Engineers: The Primacy 
of Politics over Technology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). 
10 Bryan R. Early and Erik Gartzke, “Spying from Space: Reconnaissance Satellites and Interstate 
Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, (March 2021). https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002721995894, p. 4 
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notion of the “fog of war,” and offense military strategy and doctrine.11 This section 
revisits this model to conceptualize the psychological underpinnings of the novel ways AI 
technology and the emerging digital information ecosystem may increase inadvertent 
escalation risk. Next, the article considers how state or non-state actors might use AI 
technology to conduct mis/disinformation (i.e., information that is inaccurate or 
misleading) asymmetric operations in ways that might increase inadvertent risk.12 Finally, 
the article highlights the critical features of inadvertent escalation risk in the emerging AI-
nuclear strategic nexus, concludes with policy implications of the AI-nuclear strategic 
nexus, and suggests possible ways to mitigate inadvertent escalation risk and improve 
strategic stability. 
 
Conceptualizing inadvertent Escalation: Escalation ladders, dominance, and other 
metaphors 
The concept of escalation is at its core a fundamentally psychological and perceptual one. 
Like other related concepts such as deterrence and strategic stability, escalation relies 
upon the actor's unique understanding of context, motives, and intentions – especially in 
the use of capabilities. 13 How actors resolve these complex psychological variables 
associated with the cause, means, and effects of a military attack (both kinetic and non-
kinetic) remains a perplexing and invariably elusive endeavor.14 Furthermore, deterring 
escalation is generally achieved as a result of the fear and uncertainty (or “fear of eruption”) 
of how an adversary might assess capabilities, threats, and respond (or overreact) to a 
 
11 Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
12 For a recent exploration of the effects of misinformation and disinformation on attributes of the digital 
ecosystem see, Rachel Armitage and Cristian Vaccari, “Misinformation and disinformation,” in Howard 
Tumber and Silvio Waisbord (ed) The Routledge Companion to Media Disinformation and Populism, 
(London, UK: Routledge, 2021), chapter 3; and Cristian Vaccari and Andrew Chadwick, ‘Deepfakes and 
Disinformation: Exploring the Impact of Synthetic Political Video on Deception, Uncertainty, and Trust in 
News’, Social Media + Society, February 19, 2020, 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2056305120903408 
13 See, Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (New York, NY: Polity, 2004); Lawrence Freedman, The 
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003); Thomas Schelling, Arms and 
Influence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966); Glen H. Snyder, Deterrence and 
Defense: Towards a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961); and 
Partick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Michael 
Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects (Oxford: Oxford, University 
Press 2009); and Colby Elbridge and Michael Gerson. Eds., Strategic Stability: Contending 
Interpretations (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2013); and Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms 
Dynamic in World Politics, (London: Boulder & London Lynne Reinner, 1998).  
14 See, Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, 
NY: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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situation, rather than the perceived costs or military advantages of escalation per se.15 
How might uncertainty about digital vulnerabilities affect inadvertent escalation dynamics? 
 Escalation theorizing came into prominence during the Cold War era with the 
development of nuclear weapons, particularly the need to conceptualize and control 
conflict below the level of all-out total war. Nuclear theories of escalation continue to 
provide the theoretical basis for escalatory strategies and undergird debates about nuclear 
deterrence,16 strategic planning, and how a conventional skirmish could become a nuclear 
war. On escalation, Herman Kahn's seminal work conceptualizes a 44-rung escalation 
ladder metaphor, which moves from low-scale violence to localized nuclear war (or 
counter value warfare) to conventional and nuclear attacks against civilian populations (or 
strategic counter value warfare).17 Kahn's 'escalation ladder' metaphor hinges on the idea 
of psychological obstacles, thresholds, or stages of the escalation process that would 
impose a threshold (or firebreak) to the next rung or step up the ladder in ascending order 
of intensity.18 Escalation theory’s emphasis on the importance of firebreaks between the 
rungs underscored the qualitative, psychological (both rational and irrational), and 
normative difference (or “normative stigma” and taboo) between nuclear and non-nuclear 
domains.19  
A seminal study by the RAND Corporation defined escalation as “an increase in 
the intensity or scope of conflict that crosses a threshold(s) considered significant by one 
or more of the participants.”20  An “unintentional” increased intensity or scope of a 
situation can be inadvertent, catalytic, or accidental – encompassing incorrect or 
unauthorized usage (see Figure 1).21 Intentional escalators knowingly take actions that 
 
15 On uncertainty as a cause of war see, Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 
1988); Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics; and Rose 
McDermott, “Decision-making under Uncertainty,” in Proceedings of a workshop on deterring 
cyberattacks: Informing strategies and developing options for US policy, ed. National Research Council 
(Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2010), pp. 227-242. 
16 Classical deterrence theorizing in the context of nuclear weapons can be categorized as deterrence by 
denial, deterrence by retaliation, and deterrence by punishment. See, Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by 
Denial and Punishment (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, January 1959). 
17 Kahn sub-divides these 44 rungs into seven units with seven thresholds (or firebreaks), which denote 
important inflection points along the escalation continuum. Kahn, On escalation, p. 40. 
18 Ibid. p. 39-40. 
19 See Nina Tannenwald The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-
Use (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
20 Forrest E. Morgan, and Karl P. Mueller et al. Dangerous thresholds: managing Escalation in the 21st 
century (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008), p. 8. 
21 Escalation, in a broader sense, can be both violent (kinetic) and non-violent (non-kinetic) in nature and 
occur during a military exchange (“vertical escalation”) or represent an expansion in the scope and range 
of a conflict (“horizontal escalation”). In contrast, “political escalation” refers to non-military changes in 
the scope or intensity of a situation – i.e., rhetorical, an articulation of expansive objectives, or changes to 
the accepted rules of engagement). See, Morgan et al. Dangerous thresholds: managing Escalation in the 
21st century, chapter 2. 
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cross thresholds (or firebreaks) for strategic gain, to send a signal of intent, obtain 
information about an adversary (i.e., resolve, credibility commitment, or risk acceptance), 
or avert military defeat (i.e., through pre-emption, a “bolt-from-the-blue” attack, or gray-
zone tactics).22 In contrast, inadvertent escalation occurs when an actor crosses a threshold 
that it considers benign, but the other side considers significant.23 The escalator may, for 
example, send a signal to an adversary that it does not intend to cross a threshold but is 




Figure 1: “Unintentional escalation” [Author’s design] 
 
These distinctions are not, however, binary, or mutually exclusive. An escalation 
mechanism that leads from a crisis or conflict to its outcome can involve more than one 
of these categories. For example, a “false flag cyber-operations”25 by a third-party actor 
targeting a state’s nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems 
 
22 For discussion on why a state might contemplate intentional escalation see, Kelly M. Greenhill and 
Peter Krause (ed), Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), pp. 11-12. 
23 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation. 
24 For example, amidst heightened tensions in the Baltics, NATO's actions to bolster its deterrence posture 
in Eastern Europe might be perceived by Moscow as preparation for a preemptive military offensive, thus 
risking inadvertent counter-escalation by Russia. Ulrich Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO 
playbook (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018). 
25 A false flag cyber-operation is designed to deflect attribution to a neutral party, and the actor behind the 
attack took steps to impersonate or use the distinctive infrastructure, tactics, techniques, or procedures to 
appear as if it had been the work of another. For example, the Olympic Destroyer cyberattack against the 
2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games is regarded as having been a false flag operation in which 
Russia's GRU designed its attack to appear as if it had been the work of North Korea. Andy Greenberg, 
“The Untold Story of the 2018 Olympics Cyberattack, the Most Deceptive Hack in History,” Wired 










accidentally sets in train escalatory mechanisms because the victim perceives the attack 
as a precursor to a preemptive strike by an adversary. 26  In this example, the actor 
accidentally breaches another’s psychological (real or illusory) threshold,27  triggering 
counter-escalation dynamics that could be in response to misinformation, fear, or  
misperception – also known as “catalytic escalation.”28 Moreover, within the broader 
digital information ecosystem associated with the “Third Nuclear Age,”29 the deliberate 
use of nuclear weapons that originates from a false, manipulated, or distorted assessment 
of a situation (e.g., in response to an early-warning system false alarm), can quickly 
muddy intentionality lines.30  
In short, the binary distinction between deliberate and inadvertent use of nuclear 
weapons is inherently problematic.31 Escalation can, therefore, be a strategic bargaining 
tool (i.e., for deterrence and coercion) and a risk to be controlled and potentially 
mitigated.32 Thus, actions that are interpreted as escalatory by almost all actors (e.g., the 
use of nuclear weapons to respond to a low-level conventional conflict) while others are 
considerably less clear-cut – for instance, a cyber espionage operation against a states’ 
dual-use command and control systems.33 Consequently, escalation situations typically 
involve “competition in risk-taking” and resolve.34 Either side can intensity a situation 
 
26 Herbert Lin, “Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace,” Strategic Studies 
Quarterly, 6:3, (2012), pp. 46-70. 
27 However, not all threats in the use of force are escalatory. Escalation occurs only when at least one 
actor views this action (i.e., rhetoric or signaling) as shifting the scope or intensity of a situation. See, 
Michael Brecher, “Crisis Escalation: Model and findings,” International Political Science, 17:2, (1996), 
pp. 215-230. 
28 James Johnson, “Catalytic nuclear war’ in the age of artificial intelligence & autonomy: Emerging 
military technology and escalation risk between nuclear-armed states,” Journal of Strategic Studies 
(2021) DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1867541 
29 The concept of “nuclear ages” is a contested one. Broadly speaking, the first nuclear age refers to the 
years between 1945 and the end of the Cold War, while a second between 1989-1991 to the present. On 
the "Third Nuclear Age" see Rebecca Hersman, “Wormhole Escalation: The new nuclear age,” Texas 
National Security Review 2:3 (2020), pp. 91-109; Nicholas Miller and Vipin Narang, “Is a new nuclear 
age upon us? Why we may look back on 2019 as the point of no return,” Foreign Affairs (December 
2019); and Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, “Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons and the Onset of a Third 
Nuclear Age,” European Journal of International Security (2021), pp. 1-21. 
30 Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, p. 285. 
31 Sico van der Meer, “Reducing Nuclear Weapons Risks: A Menu of 11 Policy Options,” Policy Brief, 
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, June 2018. 
32 Deterrence and coercion require the actor that is deterring to share information about the military 
balance with the actor that is being deterred. Alternatively, an actor may employ nuclear ambiguity to 
achieve the same deterrence effect – e.g., the clandestine development of Russia’s Perimitr (or “Dead 
Hand” system). See, Early and Gartzke, “Spying from Space: Reconnaissance Satellites and Interstate 
Disputes,” p. 5.; and David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race 
and Its Dangerous Legacy (Anchor Books: New York, 2009). 
33 Technological advances in AI technology and cyber capabilities, coupled with the increasingly 
commingled nature of the state's nuclear and conventional command and control systems, have enabled 
solutions to overcome the robustness of permissive action links and increase these vulnerabilities systems. 
Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1993). 
34 Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, p. 289 
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providing the other side does not match that escalation in kind – if this escalation was not 
matched and victory achieved, the "cost of the increased effort would be below in relation 
to the benefits of victory."35 
 As Bernard Brodie noted in 1965, “since the beginning of the nuclear era there has 
been in the minds of men a strong tendency to distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear 
weapons combined with a fear of and aversion to the former,” and this distinction has 
tended “to grow stronger with time rather than weaken.”36 To be sure, recent scholarship 
questioning the validity of the public’s taboo on the use of nuclear weapons (especially as 
tools to fight terrorism and nuclear proliferation), and policy debates about the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons – which surrounded the Trump Administration’s Nuclear 
Posture Review – demonstrates the prophetic nature of Brodie’s “firebreak theory.”37 
Besides, the “fear” and “aversion” associated with nuclear weapons have been used in 
studies to explain the role of emotion and cognition play in the misperceptions about 
weapons' effectiveness. Misperceptions can create an “emotional springboard” for the 
process of reasoning that can influence nuclear non-use, deterrence, and nuclear taboos, 
which in turn informs policymaking.38  
 The escalation ladder metaphor, like any theoretical framework, has limitations.   
Actors would not necessarily, however, move sequentially and inexorably from the lower 
rungs (“sub-crisis maneuvering”) to the higher rungs (“spasm or insensate war”) – that is, 
rungs can be skipped and go up as well as down. Instead, there are many pathways and 
mechanisms – for instance, conventional vs. nuclear, tactical vs. strategic, or counterforce 
vs. counter value – between low-intensity and all-out nuclear confrontation. Besides, 
states can be at different rungs or thresholds along the “relatively continuous” pathways 
to war. 39  Despite its limitations, however, Kahn’s “escalation ladder” is a useful 
metaphorical framework to reflect on the possible available options (e.g., a show of force, 
reciprocal reprisals, costly signaling, and preemptive attacks), progression of escalation 
intensity, and scenarios in a competitive nuclear-armed dyad. This article argues that the 
introduction of AI is creating new ways (or “rungs”) and potential short-cuts up (and down) 
the ladder, which might create new mechanisms for a state to perceive (or misperceive) 
 
35 Ibid. 
36 Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965), p.  
64. 
37 See, Darryl Press, Scott Sagan, and Benjamin Valentino, “Atomic aversion: experimental evidence on 
taboos, traditions, and the non-use of nuclear weapons,” American Political Science Review 107:1 (2013), 
pp. 188-206. 
38 Frank Sauer, Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of US Nuclear Weapons (New York: 
Springer, 2015), p. 176. 
39 Ibid. p. 38. 
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others to be on a different rung, thus making some “rungs” more (or less) fluid or 
malleable. 
 Strategic rivals require a balanced understanding of how the other views the 
escalation hierarchy. During a crisis or conflict, continuous feedback about an adversary's 
intentions, where it views itself on the escalation ladder, and how shifts in the scope or 
intensity of a situation (i.e., kinetic, non-kinetic, or rhetorical) may be perceived. 40 
Because of the inherently subjective nature of escalation, actions perceived as escalatory 
by one state can be misunderstood as thus by others. 41  What characteristics of AI 
technology may create new rungs on the escalation ladder that increase the inadvertent 
risk of escalating a conventional conflict to nuclear war? 
 An important feature of escalation theory is the notion of “escalation dominance:” 
when a nuclear power force an adversary to back-down because the cost and risk 
associated with further escalation outweigh the perceived benefits. 42  The state that 
possesses a position of escalation dominance, ceteris paribus, has unique tactical 
advantages on a particular rung of the escalation ladder. Moreover, a state that has most 
to lose in a situation escalating, or fears escalation the least (i.e., it is not the one doing 
the escalation), will axiomatically achieve an element of escalation dominance in a 
situation.43 Escalation dominance is thus a function of several variables: (1) where two 
states are positioned on the escalation ladder; (2) an assessment of their respective 
capabilities (both offensive and defensive) on a particular rung; (3) each sides’ perception 
of the probability and likely outcome of moving to a different rung; and (4) the perceived 
ability of one side of the other to effectuate this shift.44 Furthermore, both sides' fear and 
aversion of intensifying a situation is also an important psychological variable of 
escalation dominance.  
 
A new model of inadvertent escalation in the digital age: 
In his seminal work on inadvertent escalation, Barry Posen identifies the major causes of 
inadvertent escalation as the “security dilemma,” the Clausewitzian notion of the “fog of 
war,” and offensively orientated military strategy and doctrine.45 This section applies 
 
40 Brecher, “Crisis Escalation: Model and findings,” pp. 215-230. 
41 Greenhill and Krause (ed), Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics, pp. 3-33. 
42 On the core logic of escalation dominance see, Kahn, On Escalation; Kahn, Thinking about the 
unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Touchstone, 1985); and Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and 
the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International Organization, 67:1 (2013), 
pp. 141-171. 
43 Ibid. p. 290 
44 Ibid. 
45 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 12-27. 
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Posen’s framework to examine the effects of AI technology on the causes of inadvertent 
escalation. In the light of recent technological change, this section revisits Posen’s 
analytical framework to examine the psychological underpinnings of security dilemma 
theorizing (misperception, cognitive bias, and heuristics) to consider the how and why the 
novel characteristics of AI technology and the emerging digital information ecosystem 
may destabilize “crisis stability” and increase inadvertent escalation risk.46 
 
The security dilemma concept 
According to “security dilemma” 47  theorizing, the relative ease of carrying out and 
defending against military attacks (the “offense-defense balance”), and the ambiguity 
about whether a weapon is offensive or defensive (the “offense-defense 
distinguishability”), can cause crisis instability and deterrence failure because these 
characteristics create fear and uncertainty about an adversary’s intentions. That is, where 
they harbor benign (i.e., non-aggressive/defensive) or malign (i.e., aggressive/offensive) 
intent towards the other side.48 In his seminal paper on the topic, Robert Jervis defines the 
security dilemma as the “unintended and undesired consequences of actions meant to be 
defensive…many of how a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others” 
– that is, one state’s gain in security can inadvertently undermine the security of others. 49 
Actors tend to perceive the accumulation of offensive capabilities  (and attendant 
offensive strategies) by others as threatening, assuming the worst respond with 
 
46 “Crisis stability” refers to the presumption that control can be maintained during crisis or conflict to 
ensure that nuclear weapons are not used – that is, a situation where neither side has an incentive to strike 
first or preemptively. Cold War-era debates on the concept centered on how specific capabilities, postures, 
and military doctrine could escalate (either intentionally or inadvertently) to nuclear crisis or war. See, 
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966); Richard 
Lebow, “Clausewitz and Nuclear Crisis Stability,” Political Science Quarterly 103:1 (1988), pp. 81-110; 
and Forrest Morgan, Crisis Stability and Long-range Strike: A comparative analysis of fighters, bombers, 
and missiles (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2013). 
47 For the seminal works on the "security dilemma" see Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations 
(London: Collins, 1951); John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and 
Realities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); and Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the 
Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30:2 (1978), pp. 169-214. 
48 For seminal work on the concept see, Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and its Critics," pp. 660-
691; Glaser and Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?" pp. 44-
82; Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” pp. 58-107; and 
Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” For studies on the ‘cyber offense-defense balance’ see, 
Gartzke and Lindsay, “Weaving tangled webs: Offense, defense, and deception in cyberspace;” Ilai 
Saltzman, “Cyber posturing and the offense-defense balance,” Contemporary Security Policy, 34:1 
(2013), pp. 40-63; Rebecca Slayton, “What is the cyber offense-defense balance? Conceptions, causes, 
and assessment,” International Security, 41:3 (2017), pp. 72-109; and Ben Garfinkel, and Allen Dafoe, 
“How does the offense-defense balance scale?” Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:6 (2019), pp. 736-763. 
49 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” pp. 169-170. 
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countermeasures – for example, arms racing, crisis mobilization, raising the alert status, 
and preemptive war.50  
 According to Jervis, it is “the fear of being exploited” that “most strongly drives 
the security dilemma.”51 As we have noted, the fear (both rational and irrational) of 
conventional skirmishes crossing the nuclear Rubicon can be found in nuclear 
policymakers' statements as far back as the 1950s.52 Therefore, security dilemma logic 
can be used to consider both peacetime spirals of political mistrust and shifts in the 
military balance, crisis stability dynamics, and escalation mechanisms once military 
conflict begins. The security dilemma concept is an inherently inadvertent phenomenon; 
that is, weapons indistinguishability (i.e., offense vs. defense) allows states to 
inadvertently (for rationale political or military reasons) threaten others, which can spark 
spirals of mutual distrust, strategic competition, and military action.53 
 There are several ways in which the security dilemma can act as a catalyst for 
inadvertent escalation that is likely to be compounded in the digital age.54 First, while 
nuclear-armed states have a shared interest in avoiding nuclear war, they also place a high 
value on their nuclear forces – both vital security assets and as symbols of national prestige 
and status.55 As a corollary, conventional weapons – devised by a nuclear power for 
defensive purposes or counterforce missions – may nonetheless be viewed by an adversary 
as an offensive threat to their nuclear survivability (discussed below). 56  Second, 
escalatory rhetoric and other aggressive responses by a threatened state (especially in 
situations of military asymmetry) may be misperceived as unprovoked malign intent and 
not as a response to the initiator's behavior prompting action and reaction spirals of 
escalation. Third, and related, the state of heightened tension and the compressed 
decision-making pressures during a conventional conflict would radically increase the 
speed by which action and reaction spirals of escalation unravel. In the digital age, these 
dynamics would be further compounded, which would reduce the options and time for de-
escalation and increase the risks of horizontal (the scope of war) and vertical (the intensity 
of war) inadvertent escalation.57 
 
50 Schelling, Arms and Influence. 
51 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” p. 172. 
52 Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option. 
53 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” pp. 170 and 193. 
54 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 12-15. 
55 See Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security 21 (1996), pp. 54-86; and Tannenwald The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and 
the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use. 
56 See Futter and Zala, “Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons and the Onset of a Third Nuclear Age,” pp. 1-21. 
57 It is also plausible that improvements in battlefield awareness and decision-making AI-enabled tool 
afford commanders more time to make decision during combat. See, Paul Scharre, “Autonomous weapons 
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 Security dilemma theorizing also ties in with the concept of the 
“capability/vulnerability paradox” in international relations.58 That is, one state's pursuit 
of a new resource to compete against other states introduces a vulnerability that is 
perceived as threatening.59 This paradox suggests that when a state’s military capabilities 
are dependent on a particular resource (i.e., that may be exploited or dominated by an 
adversary), both sides have incentives for pre-emptive first strikes – the resource 
vulnerability and not the new capability per se generate these destabilizing outcomes.60 
Much like the security dilemma, therefore, the potential impact of the 
“capability/vulnerability paradox” has increased in the context of technological 
advancements associated with the “information revolution” in military affairs (i.e., the 
centralization of information and dependencies on digital information to conduct modern 
warfare), which now includes artificial intelligence. 61  As Pentagon insider Richard 
Danzig notes, “digital technologies…are a security paradox: even as they grant 
unprecedented powers, they also make users less secure.”62 In this sense, as a cause of 
inadvertent escalation, the security dilemma connects to the broader strategic and security 
literature on misperception, emotions, and cognition in various studies evince a strong 
qualitative connection between human psychology and war.63 How might the confusion 
and uncertainty of war increase inadvertent risk? 
 
and stability,” PhD Thesis (King’s College London, 2020), 
https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.806777; and James Johnson, “Artificial Intelligence in 
Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?” The Washington Quarterly 43:2 (2020), pp. 197-211. 
58 Jacquelyn Schneider, “The capability/vulnerability paradox and military revolutions: Implications for 
computing, cyber, and the onset of war,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:6 (2019), pp. 841-863. 
59 The “capability/vulnerability paradox” in international relations may also shift when the resource being 
pursued or threatened is less ‘material’ or its strategic value changes (e.g., fossil fuels). 
60 As a helpful counterpoint, while the proliferation and dependency on the digital information ecosystem 
increase, the ubiquity of information and the intrinsic inability to control all information might create 
disincentives for first strike. Schneider, “The capability/vulnerability paradox and military revolutions: 
Implications for computing, cyber, and the onset of war,” p. 842. 
61 For example, see Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs (1996), pp. 37-54; Cohen, 
“Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27:3 (2004), pp. 395-407; 
Dahl, “Network Centric Warfare and Operational Art,” Defence Studies 2:1 (Spring 2002), pp. 17-34; 
Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” US Naval 
Institute Proceedings 124:1 (1998), pp. 28-35; and Michael Raska, “The sixth RMA wave: Disruption in 
Military Affairs?,” Journal of Strategic Studies (2020) DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1848818 
62 Richard Danzig, “Surviving on a Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Reducing the National Security Risks of 
America’s Cyber Dependencies,” Center for a New American Security, July 21, 2014, 
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/surviving-on-a-diet-of-poisonedfruit-reducing-the-national-
security-risks-of-americas-cyber-dependencies 
63 See, Robert Jervis Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976); Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions 
and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Janice G. Stein, “Building politics 
into psychology: the misperception of threat,” Political Psychology 9:2 (1988), pp. 45-71; Barbara 
Farnham, Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994); Rose McDermott, James Fowler, and Oleg Smirnov, “On the 
evolutionary origin of prospect theory preferences,” Journal of Politics 70:2 (2008), pp. 335-350; Philip 
Tetlock and Richard Boettger, “Accountability: A social magnifier of the dilution effect,” Journal of 
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Clausewitzian “fog of war” 
Inadvertent escalation risk can also be caused by the confusion and uncertainty (or “fog 
of war”) associated with gathering, analyzing, and disseminating relevant information 
about a crisis or conflict – which has important implications for the management, control, 
and termination of war.64 Traditional nuclear deterrence, crisis stability, and strategic 
stability theorizing work off the questionable premise that actors are rational and presume 
that they are therefore ‘able to understand their environment and coordinate policy 
instruments in ways that cut through the “fog of war.” 65  In reality, misperception, 
miscalculation, accidents, and failures of communication “events can readily escape 
control,” and although these escalation dynamics are often unintended, potentially 
catastrophic events can result.66 With the advent of the speed, uncertainty, complexity, 
and cognitive strains (see below) associated with conducting military operations on the 
digitized battlefield, the prospects that decision-making by "dead reckoning" – dependent 
on the experience and sound judgment of defense-planners when information is scarce 
and autonomous bias proclivities loom large – can prevent command and control failures 
caused by the “fog” seems fanciful.67 
 The confusion and uncertainty associated with the “fog of war” can increase 
inadvertent risk in three ways: (1) it can complicate the task of managing and controlling 
military campaigns at a tactical level (or situational battlefield awareness); (2) it can 
further compound the problem of offense-defense distinguishability; and (3) it can 
increase the fear of a surprise or preemptive attack (or a “bolt from the blue”).68 Taken 
together, these mechanisms can result in unintentional (and possibly irrevocable) 
outcomes and thus obfuscate the meaning and the intended goals of an adversary’s 
 
Personality & Social Psychology 57:3 (1989), pp. 388-398; and Jonathan Mercer, “Human nature and the 
first image: emotion in international politics,” Journal of International Relations & Development 9 
(2006), pp. 288–303. 
64 The strategic value of “information” has long been recognized in military affairs: (1) as a force 
multiplier to alter the balance of power during war and peace; and (2) providing knowledge about an 
adversary’s capabilities that can make political leaders more effective at recognizing acceptable bargains 
and channels for cooperation, thus ensuring peace. Early and Gartzke, “Spying from Space: 
Reconnaissance Satellites and Interstate Disputes,” p. 5. 
65 See, Bill Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2000); and Jervis, 
Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence. 
66 Robert Jervis, “Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War,” Political Science Quarterly 108:2 (1988), 
pp. 81-110. 
67 The term “dead reckoning” refers to analytical predictions, intuitions, predictions, or judgments of 
captains or pilots to navigate a ship derived from the environment's internal instruments and knowledge. 
Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, pp. 211-212. On “autonomous bias” see, Linda J. Skitka, 
Kathleen L. Mosier and Mark Burdick, “Does Automation Bias Decision-Making?” International Journal 
of Human Computer Studies, 51, 5 (1999), pp. 991–1006; and Mary L. Cummings, “Automation Bias in 
Intelligent Time-Critical Decision Support Systems,” AIAA 1st Intelligent Systems Technical Conference 
(2004), pp. 557–562. 
68 Ibid. p. 20. 
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military actions.69  In short, the dense “fog of war” increases the risk of inadvertent 
escalation because “misperceptions, misunderstandings, poor communications, and 
unauthorized or unrestrained offensive operations could reduce the ability of civilian 
authorities to influence the course of war.”70 
 While Cold War decision-makers also faced extreme domestic and foreign 
pressures to decipher the adversary's intentions correctly, these pressures are being 
amplified in the current digitized information ecosystem – reducing the timeframe for 
decision-makers during a crisis, increasing the cognitive and heuristic burdens caused by 
information overload and complexity.71 Cognitive pressures caused by the sheer volume 
of information flow (both classified and open-sources) are being compounded by the 
degraded reliably and politicization (or "weaponization") of information. These pressures 
can, in turn, make decision-makers more susceptible to cognitive bias, misperceptions, 
and heuristics (or mental shortcuts) to approach complex problem-solving – either directly 
or indirectly informing decision-making.72  
 While disinformation and psychological operations in deception and subversion 
are not a new phenomenon,73 the introduction of new AI-enhanced tools in the emerging 
digital information ecosystem enables a broader range of actors (state and non-state) with 
asymmetric techniques to manipulate, confuse, and deceive.74 Disinformation operations 
might erode the credibility of, and undermine public confidence in, a states’ retaliatory 
capabilities by targeting specific systems (i.e., command and control) or personnel 
(primarily via social media) who perform critical functions in maintaining these 
 
69 The historical record is replete with examples of how misunderstandings or incomplete information 
about ongoing military operations can contribute to escalation – for example, China’s entry into the 
Korean War; Germany’s Blitz campaign on the British Isles in 1940; and the Cuban crisis. See, Rosemary 
Foot, The Wrong War: American policy and the dimensions of the Korean conflict 1950-1953 (Ithaca, 
1985); F.M. Sallagar, The Road to Total War: Escalation in World War Two (Santa Monica: Rand 
Corporation, 1969); and Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, & Cold War Crisis (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1977). 
70 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, p. 22. 
71 Rebecca Hersman et al., “Under the Nuclear Shadow: Situational Awareness Technology and Crisis 
Decision-making,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 18, 2020, 
https://ontheradar.csis.org/analysis/final-report/ 
72 See, Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Martin 
Kaplan, Tatiana Wanshula, and Mark Zanna, “Time Pressure and Information Integration in Social 
Judgment,” in Ola Svenson, John Maule (eds) Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and 
Decision Making (Springer, Boston, MA, 1993), pp. 255-267; and Carsten De Dreu, “Time Pressure and 
Closing of the Mind in Negotiation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 91:2 
(2003), pp. 280-295. 
73 See Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020). 
74 For example, see David Sanger, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age (New 
York: Broadway Books, 2019); and Audrey K. Cronin, Power to the People: How Open Technological 
Innovation is Arming Tomorrow's Terrorists (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
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capabilities.75 For example, cyberweapons – notably “left of launch” operations – have 
been allegedly used by the United States to undermine Iranian and North Korean 
confidence in their nuclear forces and technological preparedness.76  
 The potential utility of social media to amplify the effects of a disinformation 
campaign was demonstrated during the Ukrainian Crisis in 2016 when military 
personnel’s cell phones were the victims of Russian information operations.77 However, 
the use of these novel techniques during a nuclear crisis and how they might impact the 
“fog of war” is less understood and empirically untested.78 During a nuclear crisis, a state 
might attempt, for instance, to influence and shape the domestic debate of an adversary 
(e.g., shift preferences, exacerbate domestic-political polarization, or coerce/co-opt 
groups and individuals on social media) in order to improve its bargaining hand by 
delegitimizing (or legitimizing) the use of nuclear weapons during an escalating situation, 
or bring pressure to bear on an adversary’s leadership to sue for peace or de-escalate a 
situation – a tactic which may, of course, dangerously backfire.79  
 Moreover, a third-party (state or non-state) actor to achieve its nefarious goals 
could employ active information techniques (e.g., spreading false information of a nuclear 
detonation, troop movement, or missiles leaving their garrison) during a crisis between 
nuclear rivals (e.g., India-Pakistan, US-China, Russia-NATO) to incite crisis instability.80 
Public pressures on decision-makers from these crisis dynamics, and evolving at a pace 
that may outpace events on the ground, might impel (especially thinned-skinned and 
inexperienced) leaders, operating under the shadow of the deluge of twenty-four-hour 
 
75 Kristiina Müür, Holger Mölder, and Vladimir Sazonov, “A Comparative Overview of Online News,” in 
Vladimir Sazonov et al. (ed) Russian Information Warfare against the Ukrainian State and Defence 
Forces (NATO Strategic Communications, 2016), pp. 70-99. 
76 See, Riki Ellison, “Left of Launch,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (2015) 
https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alert/3132/. 
77 Marie Baezner and Patrice Robin, Cyber and Information warfare in the Ukrainian conflict (Zurich, 
Switzerland: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2018).  
78 Harold Trinkunas, Herbert Lin, and Benjamin Loehrke, Three Tweets to Midnight: Effects of the Global 
Information Ecosystem on the Risk of Nuclear Conflict (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2020), pp. 
150-152; and Johnson, “Catalytic nuclear war in the age of artificial intelligence & autonomy: Emerging 
military technology and escalation risk between nuclear-armed states.” 
79 Russia, for example, reportedly conducted an active information campaign against several NATO states 
to influence the public discourse and policymakers to destabilize NATO's missile defense operations in 
Europe. See, Hege Eilersten, "Russia's Ambassador warns: Missile shield will endanger Norway’s 
borders,” High North News February 22, 2017, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russias-ambassador-
warns-missile-shield-will-endanger-norways-borders. 
80 See, Robert Ayson, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism,” 33:7 (2010), pp. 571-593; and Hayes, Peter, “Non-State Terrorism and Inadvertent Nuclear 
War,” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability Special Reports, January 18, 2018. 
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social media feedback and public scrutiny, to take actions that they might not otherwise 
have.81  
 In sum, the emerging AI-enhanced digitized information environment, though not 
fundamentally altering the premise upon which actors (de)escalate a situation, imperfect 
information, uncertainty, and risk associated with the “fog of war,” nonetheless, 
introduces novel tools of misinformation and disinformation and an abundance of 
information radically alters the cognitive pressures placed on decision-makers during 
crisis and conflict. Besides, decision-makers subjection to an abundance of disparate and 
often unverified information will indubitably influence actors' (collectively or individuals) 
policy preferences and perceptions. As a result, complicating the security dilemma 
challenge of understanding an adversary's capabilities, intentions, doctrine, and strategic 
thinking, with potentially profound repercussions for escalation dynamics. How might 
these pressures affect states' regional conflicts with different military doctrine, objectives, 
and attitudes to risk? 
 
Offensive military doctrine & strategy 
Because of a lack of understanding between (nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed) 
adversaries about where the new tactical possibilities offered by these capabilities figure 
on the Cold War-era escalation ladder, thus the pursuit of new “strategic non-nuclear 
weapons” (e.g., cyber weapons, drones, missile defense, precision munitions, 
counterspace weapons) increases the risk of misperception.82 The fusion of AI technology 
into conventional weapon systems (i.e., to enhance autonomous weapons, remote sensing 
for reconnaissance, improving missile guidance and situational awareness) is creating new 
possibilities for a range of destabilizing counterforce options targeting states’ nuclear-
weapon delivery and support systems; for example, cyber NC3 “kill switch” attacks or 
tracking adversaries nuclear-armed submarines and mobile missile launchers.83 
 Russia, the United States, and China are currently pursuing a range of dual-capable 
(conventional and nuclear-capable) delivery systems (e.g., hypersonic guide vehicles, 
stealth bombers, and a range of precision munitions) and advanced conventional weapons 
 
81 Trinkunas, Lin, and Loehrke, Three Tweets to Midnight: Effects of the Global Information Ecosystem 
on the Risk of Nuclear Conflict, p. 152.  
82 “Strategic non-nuclear weapons” are also referred to as strategic conventional weapons or advanced 
conventional weapons. See James Acton, “Russia and strategic conventional weapons: Concerns and 
response,” Nonproliferation Review, 22:2 (2015), pp. 141-154; and Futter and Zala, “Strategic Non-
Nuclear Weapons and the Onset of a Third Nuclear Age,” pp. 1-21. 
83 See, Andrew Futter, Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2018), pp. 117-125. 
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(drones, space-based, and cyber weapons.84) that are capable of achieving strategic effects 
– that is, without the need to use nuclear weapons.85 These lines are blurred further by the 
use of dual-use command and control systems (i.e., early-warning, situational awareness, 
and surveillance) to manage conventional and nuclear missions.86 Chinese analysts, for 
example, while concerned about the vulnerabilities of their command and control systems 
to cyber-attacks, are optimistic about the deployment of AI augmentation (e.g., ISR, 
intelligent munitions, and unmanned aerial vehicles) to track and target an adversary’s 
forces, and will lower cost of (economic and political) signaling and deploying military 
forces.87 
 Advances in AI technology, in conjunction with the technologies it can enable 
(e.g., remote sensing, hypersonic technology, and robotics and autonomy), increase the 
speed, precision, lethality, and survivability of strategic non-nuclear weapons, thus 
exacerbating the destabilizing effects of these capabilities used by nuclear-armed rivals. 
Thus, opening new pathways for both horizontal and vertical inadvertent escalation.88 
Moreover, these technological advances have been accompanied by destabilizing 
doctrinal shifts by certain regional nuclear powers (Russia, North Korea, and possibly 
China), which indicates a countenance of the limited use of nuclear weapons to deter an 
 
84 See, US Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China 2020 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020); and US National 
Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2020 (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020). 
85 For example, Russia deploys dual-use ground-launched cruise missiles, India and Pakistan possess dual-
payload ground-launched missiles. China's DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile is dual-capable, and 
the US, China, Russia, India, and Pakistan all have nuclear-capable aircraft capable of supporting 
conventional systems. See James M. Acton, “Is It a Nuke? Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent 
Escalation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 9, 2020, 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/09/is-it-nuke-pre-launch-ambiguity-and-inadvertent-escalation-
pub-81446.; Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Julia Diamond, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2018,” 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74:5 (2018), p. 355; and Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Indian 
Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74:6 (2018), p. 363, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1533162. 
86 See, James M. Acton; Li Bin, Alexey Arbatov, Petr Topychkanov, and Zhao Tong. Entanglement: 
Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, edited by James M. 
Acton, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017); and Hersman et al., 
“Under the Nuclear Shadow: Situational Awareness Technology and Crisis Decision-making.” 
87 See, John Schaus and Kaitlyn Johnson, “Unmanned Aerial Systems’ Influences on Conflict Escalation 
Dynamics,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 7, 2018, 
https://aerospace.csis.org/unmanned-aerial-systems-influences-on-conflict-escalationdynamics/. 
88 See, Keir A. Lieber, Darryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the 
Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security, 41(4) (Spring 2017), pp.9-49; and Paul Bracken, 
“The Cyber Threat to Nuclear Stability,” Orbis 60:2 (2016), pp.188-203; Dean Wilkening, “Hypersonic 
Weapons and Strategic Stability,” Survival 61:5 (2019), pp. 129-148; and Horowitz, Paul Scharre, and 
Alexander Velez-Green, "A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial 
Intelligence," arXiv (December 2019) https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.05291. 
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attack (or “escalate to de-escalate”), in situations where they face a superior conventional 
adversary and the risk of large-scale conventional aggression.89  
 Furthermore, volatility in nuclear-armed states' civil-military relations can create 
internal pressures to pursue a more aggressive nuclear force posture or doctrine.90 The 
assumption that new (and latent) regional nuclear-states will act in ways that reflect their 
interests as rational actors to avoid nuclear war, thus enhance deterrence (or “rational 
deterrence theory” 91 ) and crisis stability, understates the role of influential military 
organizations (i.e., offensive-doctrinal bias, parochialism, and behavioral rigidities) in 
shaping nuclear doctrine that can lead to deterrence failure and nuclear escalation – 
despite national security interests to the contrary.92 For instance, in a nuclear-armed state 
where the military officers influence the nuclear strategy, the adoption of offensive 
doctrines may emerge that reflect volatile civil-military relations rather than strategic 
realities.93  
 In short, technological advancements to support states' nuclear deterrence 
capabilities will develop in existing military organizations imbued with their norms, 
cultures, structures, and invariably, mutually exclusive strategic interests. China’s 
“military-civil fusion" concept (a dual-use integration strategy) designed to co-opt or 
coerce Chinese commercial entities to support the technological development of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to meet the needs of “intelligentized warfare in the 
future” – is an important test-case in a civilian-led initiative designed to drive military 
 
89 For example, Russia's military doctrine explicitly states it would consider nuclear weapons to respond 
to a large-scale conventional attack. While China maintains an official no-first-use policy, defense 
analysts continue to debate the veracity of this pledge, particularly in the event of conventional military 
aggression against a superior adversary in the Taiwan Straits or target China's dual-use military platforms. 
On Russia see, Alexey Arbatov, Petr Topychkanov, and Vladimir Dvorkin, Entanglement: A new security 
threat a Russian Perspectives (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), pp. 
25-26. On China see, Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese 
Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security 41:4 (2017), pp. 
50-92. 
90 See, Scott Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread 
of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18:4 (1994), pp. 66-107. 
91 Several defensive-realist international relations scholars have argued that self-interested rational unitary 
actors will likely behave in ways that reduce the dangers associated with the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 
84:3 (1990), pp. 731-745. 
92 Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons,” p. 102. 
93 States that have volatile civil-military relations are also more vulnerable to accidents involving nuclear 
operations. Ibid. pp. 98-99. 
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innovation in the pursuit of broader geostrategic objectives.94 The impact of China’s 
“military-civil fusion” on civil-military relations remains unclear, however.95  
 US counterforce capabilities – to disarm an enemy without resort to nuclear 
weapons – used in conjunction with air and missile defenses to mop up any residual 
capabilities after an initial attack will generate crisis instability and "use it or lose it" 
pressures.96 Chinese analysts, for example, have expressed concern that US advances in 
AI could overwhelm Chinese air defenses, thus reducing the time available to 
commanders to respond to an imminent attack – for example, from the US autonomous 
AI-enabled Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (AGM-158C) designed to target “high-priority 
targets.”97 Furthermore, the increased optimism in states’ ability to use AI-enhancements 
to find, track, and destroy others' nuclear forces enabled by AI technology (notably when 
military-capability imbalances exist) will be an inherently destabilizing phenomenon.98 
What one side views as conventional operations might be viewed by the other side as a 
precursor to a disabling counterforce attack (e.g., targeting dual-use command and control 
centers and air defenses), thus increasing inadvertent escalation risk.99  
 Because of the asymmetry of interest at stake in a regional crisis involving the 
United States, the stakes will likely favor the defending nuclear-armed power. 100 
 
94 Suppose the Chinese government wants a technology that a particular commercial entity controls; extra-
legal influence or coercion can compel the company to turn it over. In that case, forced technology 
transfers are not thought to occur routinely or considered effective. See Elsa B. Kania and Lorand Laskai, 
Myths and Realities of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy (Washington, DC: Center for a New 
American Security, 2021). 
95 For recent research on civil-military cooperation and technological innovation see, Maaike Verbruggen, 
“The Role of Civilian Innovation in the Development of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems,” Global 
Policy 10, no. 3 (2019), pp. 338–42.  
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the damage it would suffer from a nuclear exchange or believe that the other side might launch a 
counterforce attack. Observers have also debated whether India and China are moving in the same 
direction. See, US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Secretary, 2018), p. 23; Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, "India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic 
Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities,” International Security 43:3 (2018/2019), pp. 7-52; and Talmadge, 
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97 Zhang Yao, Wang Yonghai, Wang Jinghua, Li Manhong, Lu Ruimin, and Wang Liyan, 
“Performance Analysis and Research of LRASM, the Next Generation of US Anti-ship Missile,” 
Aerodynamic Missile Journal, July 15, 2018, 
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According to "prospect theory," a regional power would perceive the relative significance 
of a potential loss more highly than again.101 That is, when prospect theory is applied to 
deterrence dynamics, leaders are inclined to take more risks (i.e., risk-acceptant) to protect 
their positions, status, and reputations, than they are to enhance their position.102 Thus, 
having suffered a loss leaders are generally predisposed to engage in excessive risk-taking 
behavior to recover lost territory – or other position or reputational damage.103 If, for 
instance, Chinese of North Korean leaders are faced with the prospect of an imminent 
attack on Taiwan or Pyongyang view their regime survival at stake, they would likely 
countenance greater risks to avoid this potential (existential) loss.104 Furthermore, these 
capabilities' crisis instability could also result from irrational behavior derived from 
misperception, cognitive biases, or other emotional impulses, which makes nuclear 
escalation more likely.105  
 For example, Chinese analysts tend to overestimate the US’s military AI 
capabilities relative to open-source reports – often citing outdated or inaccurate 
projections of US AI “warfighting” budgets, development, and force posture.106  The 
framing of Chinese discussion on US military AI projects is analogous to Soviet concerns 
about the missile gap with the US during the Cold War;107  thus, risk compounding 
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Beijing’s fear that AI technology could be strategically destabilizing.108 In a world with 
imperfect (and asymmetric) information about the balance of power and resolve, and 
incentives to misrepresent and manipulate perceptions (exploit psychological dispositions 
and vulnerabilities) and emotions (strategic framing and fear appeals) of the information 
ecosystem, bargaining failure, and war are more likely.109 
 Given the confluence of secrecy, complexity, erroneous or ambiguous intelligence 
data (especially from open-source intelligence and social media outlets), 110  AI-
augmentation will likely exacerbate compressed decision-making and the inherent 
asymmetric nature of cyberspace information.111 For example, using AI-enhanced cyber 
capabilities to degrade or destroy a nuclear-states command and control systems – whether 
as part of a deliberate coercive counterforce attack or in error as part of a limited 
conventional strike – may generate preemptive "use it or lose it" situations.112 In a US-
China conflict scenario, for instance, a US penchant for counterforce operations targeting 
adversary's command and control, the comingled nature of China's (nuclear and 
conventional) missile forces, US and Chinese preference for the preemptive use of 
cyberweapons, and domestic-political pressures on both sides to retaliate for costly losses 
(either physical/kinetic or nonphysical/political), increases the dangers of inadvertent 
escalation.113 
 These risks should give defense planners pause for thought using advanced 
conventional capabilities to project military power in conflicts with regional nuclear 
powers. In short, conventional doctrines and operational concepts could exacerbate old 
(e.g., third-party interference, civil-military overconfidence, regime type, accidental or 
unauthorized use, or an overzealous commander with pre-delegation authority) and create 
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new pathways (e.g., AI-enhanced ISR and precision missile targeting and guidance, drone 
swarms, AI-cyberattacks, and mis/disinformation subversion) to uncontrollable 
inadvertent escalation. Missile defenses and advanced conventional weapons are unlikely 
to prevent these escalatory mechanisms once battlefield perception shifts and the nuclear 
threshold is crossed.114  
 To the extent to which a state may succeed in limiting the damage from a nuclear 
exchange in using technologically enhanced (including AI) counterforce operations 
continues to be an issue of considerable debate.115 However, from the perspective of 
inadvertent escalation, the efficacy of damage-limitation counterforce tactics is less 
significant than whether an adversary views them as such. Chinese and Russian fear that 
the United States is developing and deploying conventional counterforce capabilities -
(especially cyberattacks on NC3 systems) to blunt their nuclear deterrence risks 
generating “crisis instability” caused by “use it or lose it” pressures – that is, pressures to 
use nuclear weapons before losing the capability to do so. 116  
 Nuclear powers maintain different attitudes and perceptions on the escalation risk 
posed by cyberattacks and information warfare more generally, however. Chinese 
analysts, in particular, have expressed an acute awareness of the potential vulnerabilities 
of their respective NC3 systems to cyber-attacks.117 The United States has begun to take 
this threat more seriously, whereas Russian strategists, despite bolstering their cyber 
defenses appear more sanguine and view information warfare as a continuation of 
peacetime politics by other means.118 Consequently, the risk of inadvertent escalation 
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caused by misperception and miscalculation will likely increase.119 In what ways might 
the new tools and techniques emerging in digitized information exacerbate these dynamics?  
 
The digitized information ecosystem, human psychology, and inadvertent risk: 
Misperceptions, cognitive bias, and the human psychological features of security dilemma 
theorizing can also be used to elucidate the escalatory dynamics that can follow from 
inflammatory, emotionally-charged, and other offensive public rhetoric (e.g., fake news, 
disinformation, rumors, and propaganda) used by adversaries during crisis – or saber-
rattling behavior.120 During, in anticipation of, or to incite a crisis or conflict, a state or 
non-state actor (e.g., clandestine digital “sleeper cells”) could employ sub-conventional 
(or “grey zone”) information warfare campaigns to amplify its impact by sowing division, 
erode public confidence, and delaying an effective official response.121  
 The public confusion and disorder that followed a mistaken cell phone alert 
warning residents in Hawaii of an imminent ballistic missile threat in 2018 serve as a 
worrying sign of the vulnerabilities of US civil defenses against state or non-state actors' 
seeking asymmetric advantages vis-à-vis a superior adversary – that is, compensating for 
its limited nuclear capabilities.122 North Korea, for example, might conceivably replicate 
incidents like the Hawaii false alarm in 2018 in a disinformation campaign (i.e., issuing 
false evacuation orders, issuing false nuclear alerts, and subverting real ones via social 
media) to cause mass confusion.123 
 During a crisis in the South China Seas or South Asia, for example, when tensions 
are running high, state or non-state disinformation campaigns could have an outsized 
impact on influencing crisis stability (dependent on the interpretation and processing of 
reliable intelligence) with potentially severe escalatory consequences. This impact would 
be compounded when populist decision-makers heavily rely on social media for 
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information-gathering and open-source intelligence and thus more susceptible to social 
media manipulation.124 In extremis, a populist leader may come to view social media as 
an accurate barometer of public sentiment, eschewing official (classified and non-
classified) evidence-based intelligence sources, and regardless of the origins of this virtual 
voice – that is, from genuine users or fake accounts as part of a malevolent disinformation 
campaign. Consequently, the agenda-setting framing narrative of decision-makers during 
a crisis would instead be informed by a fragmented and politicized social media 
information ecosystem; amplifying rumors, conspiracy theories, and radical polarization, 
which in turn, reduces the possibility of achieving a public consensus to inform and 
legitimatize decisions during a crisis. Such dynamics may also expose decision-makers to 
increased “rhetorical entrapment” pressure whereby alternative policy options (viable or 
otherwise) may be overlooked or dismissed out of hand.125  
 Furthermore, increased public scrutiny levels – especially coupled with 
disinformation and public panic – could further increase political pressures on leaders 
whose electoral success determines their political survival.126 Under crisis conditions, 
these dynamics may compromise diplomatic de-escalation efforts and complicate other 
issues that can influence crisis stability, including maintaining a credible deterrence and 
public confidence in a state's retaliatory capability and effective signaling resolve to 
adversaries and assurance to allies.127 State or non-state disinformation campaigns might 
also be deployed in conjunction with other AI-augmented non-kinetic/political (e.g., 
cyberattacks, deep fake technology, or disinformation campaigns via social media 
amplified by automated bots) or kinetic/military (e.g., drone swarms, missile defense, 
anti-satellite weapons, or hypersonic weapons) actions to distract decision-makers – thus, 
reducing their response time during a crisis and conferring a tactical or operational 
advantage to an adversary.128  
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 For example, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack in India's Jammu and Kashmir 
in 2019, a disinformation campaign (e.g., fake news and false and doctored images) that 
spread via social media amid a heated national election, 129  inflamed emotions and 
domestic-political escalatory rhetoric, that in turn, promoted calls for retaliation against 
Pakistan and brought two-nuclear armed adversaries close to conflict. 130  This crisis 
provides a sobering glimpse of how information and influence campaigns between two 
nuclear-armed adversaries can affect crisis stability and the concomitant risks of 
inadvertent escalation. In short, the catalyzing effect of costly signaling and testing the 
limits of an adversary's resolve (which did not previously exist) to enhance security 
instead increases inadvertent escalation risks and leaves both sides less secure.  
 The effect of escalatory imbued rhetoric in the information ecosystem can be a 
double-edged sword for inadvertent escalation risk. On the one hand, public rhetorical 
escalation can mobilize domestic support and signal deterrence and resolve to an 
adversary – making war less likely. On the other hand, sowing public fear, distrust (e.g., 
confidence in the legitimacy and reliability of NC3 systems), and threatening a leader’s 
reputation and image (e.g., the credibility of strategic decision-makers and robustness of 
nuclear launch protocols) domestically can prove costly, and in turn, may inadvertently 
make enemies of unresolved actors. For example, following the Hague’s Permanent Court 
of Arbitration ruling against China over the territorial disputes in the South China Seas in 
2016, the Chinese government had to resort to social media censorship to stem the flood 
of nationalism, calling for war with US ally the Philippines.131 Furthermore, domestic 
public disorder and confusion – caused, for example, by a disinformation campaign or 
cyberattacks – can in itself act as an escalatory force, putting decision-makers under 
pressure to respond forcefully to foreign or domestic threats, to protect a states’ legitimacy, 
self-image, and credibility.132  
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 These rhetorical escalation dynamics can simultaneously reduce the possibility for 
face-saving de-escalation efforts by either side – analogous to Thomas Schelling's "tying-
hands mechanism."133 During heightened tensions between the United States and North 
Korea in 2017, for instance, the Trump administration's heated war of words with Kim 
Jong Un, whether a madman's bluff or in earnest (or "rattle the pots and pans") raised the 
costs of Kim Jong Un backing down (i.e., with regime survival at stake), thus increasing 
inadvertent escalation risk, and simultaneously, complicating de-escalation.134 Because of 
the fear that its nuclear (and conventional) forces are vulnerable to a decapacitating first 
strike, rhetorical escalation between a conventionally inferior and superior state is 
especially dangerous. 135  Research would be beneficial on how the contemporary 
information ecosystem might affect decision-making in different political systems. 
 Ultimately, states' willingness to engage in nuclear brinkmanship will depend 
upon information (and mis/disinformation), cognitive bias, and the perception of, and the 
value attached to, what is at stake. Thus, if one side considers the potential consequences 
of not going to war as intolerable (i.e., regime survival, the “tying-hands,” or “use it or 
lose it” pressures), then off-ramps, firebreaks, or other de-escalation measures will be 
unable to prevent crisis instability from intensifying.136 Finally, to the extent to which 
public pressure emanating from the contemporary information environment affects 
whether nuclear war remains “special” or “taboo” will be critical for reducing the risk of 
inadvertent escalation by achieving crisis stability during a conventional war between 
nuclear-armed states. Future research would be beneficial a) on how the digitized 
information ecosystem affects decision-making in different political regimes, and b) the 
potential effect of asymmetry and learning in the distribution of countries with advanced 
AI-capabilities and dynamics associated with its adoption. Will nuclear-armed states with 
advanced AI-enabled capabilities treat less advanced nuclear peers that lack these 
capabilities differently? And how might divergences in states synthesis and adoption of 
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How can decision-makers mitigate the inadvertent escalation risks associated with AI and 
nuclear systems? Possible ways forward include inter alia, arms control and verification, 
changes to norms and behavior, unilateral measures and restraint, and bilateral and 
multilateral stability dialogue. AI technology is already raising a multitude of questions 
about warfare and shifts in the balance of power, which are challenging traditional arms 
control thinking.137 Traditional arms control and non-proliferation frameworks of nuclear 
governance are not necessarily obsolete, however.138 Instead, we will need to depart from 
conventional siloed, rigid, and stove-piped approaches and search for innovative 
frameworks and novel approaches to meet the challenges of the rapidly evolving dual-use 
technology, the linkages between conventional and nuclear weapons, and the 
informational challenges in the new nuclear age. An asymmetric arms control framework 
emphasizes the importance of dynamism – allowing for mutual adjustment in force 
posture in ways that differ from the traditional “like-for-like” approach to arms control – 
in designing such agreements would be a sensible starting point.139  
 Recent discussion about AI technology (especially lethal autonomous systems) 
and arms control has focused on how military AI might be managed, restricted (“keeping 
humans in the loop”), or prohibited – for targeting and use of nuclear weapons.140 AI could, 
perhaps counterintuitively, also offer innovative solutions to develop new and revise 
legacy arms control frameworks and contribute to non-interference mechanisms (NTM) 
for arms control verification – reducing the need for “boots on the ground” inspectors in 
sensitive facilities. 141  For instance, AI object identification applications to augment 
satellite imagery of missile production facilities or test ranges, and pattern recognition 
tools (that detects anomalies from vast amounts of data),142 might be used to support arms 
verification efforts, identify cheating behavior under an arms control agreement, assess 
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the nature of suspicious military movements, and in turn, enhance the credibility of future 
strategic arms control agreements. 143 Authentic, verified, and reliable open-source 
information should also be leveraged to support these gathering and analysis efforts.  
 The use of AI-augmentation to enhance states’ early-warning and detection 
systems to improve target identification might prevent false positives (or nuclear "close 
calls"),144 reduce bias, and improve the understanding of an adversary's actions (or reduce 
the "fog of war"), thus lowering the risk of inadvertent escalation during a crisis.145 Also, 
incorporating AI into early warning systems may be particularly stabilizing for countries 
that do not have the advanced satellites, sensors, and forward-deployed radar systems that 
the US and Russia have developed to ensure missile launches are detected and assessed 
for threat potential.146  AI-augmented early warning and detection systems could, for 
instance, offer Beijing improved transparency and confidence about US military 
operations in the Indo-Pacific (i.e., to discern and discriminate between nuclear and 
conventional weapons systems in an incoming attack), thus reducing inadvertent 
escalation dynamics caused by miscalculation, false positives, or surprise.147 
 AI technology could also improve the safety of nuclear systems. For instance, it 
could increase the security and robustness of command-and-control cyber defenses by 
identifying undetected vulnerabilities or other potentially undiscovered weaknesses. The 
US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has, for example, already 
begun to study the ways AI may be used to identify vulnerabilities in conventional military 
systems.148 Success in efforts such as these might also help bolster nuclear deterrence and 
mitigate inadvertent (and accidental) escalation risk. AI could also support defense 
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planners design and manage wargaming and other virtual training exercises to refine 
operational concepts, test various conflict scenarios, and identify areas and technologies 
for potential development. 149 Thus, enabling participants to better prepare against 
adversaries in unpredictable, fast-moving environments and where unpredictable and 
counterintuitive human-machine and machine-machine interactions will inevitably take 
place.150  
 Finally, expanding the topics and approaches for bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives such as confidence-building measures, should include the novel non-kinetic 
escalatory risks associated with complexity in the AI and the digital domain (e.g., 
dis/misinformation, deepfakes, information sabotage, and social media weaponization) 
during conventional crises and conflict involving nuclear-armed states.151  Today, AI 
technology is not currently integrated into states’ nuclear targeting, command and control, 
or launch systems; thus, a narrow window exists for nuclear powers (the P5 members as 
well as India, Pakistan, Israel, and NATO states) to agree on new principles, practices, 
and norms (e.g., banning attacks on nuclear-armed states’ NC3 systems), and enshrine 
these into international law. For instance, within the framework of the United Nations 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and tailored to the specific features of the 
technology and coordinated by the UN Conference on Disarmament.152 Specific measures 
might include, prohibiting or imposes limits on the fusion of AI technology in nuclear 
command and control systems, autonomous nuclear-armed missiles, and nuclear weapons 
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To what extent might AI-enabled capabilities increase inadvertent escalation risk? In a 
global security environment characterized by great power strategic competition and 
regional strategic asymmetry (capabilities, domains, and stakes), new rungs, firebreaks, 
and thresholds on the escalation ladder are already challenging conventional assumptions 
of deterrence, strategic stability, and escalation. This article underscores the need for 
greater clarity and discussion on the specific characteristics of AI technology that may 
create new (or disrupt old) rungs on the metaphorical escalation ladder, and in turn, 
increase the risk of inadvertently transitioning crises between nuclear-armed (and 
especially regional) states from conventional to nuclear confrontation. The article builds-
on and adapts the foundational work on inadvertent escalation conducted at the end of the 
Cold War (on the cusp of the “Second Nuclear Age”). Specifically, it examines the 
psychological underpinnings of escalation theorizing to elucidate whether and how 
characteristics of AI technology, contextualized with the broader digital information 
ecosystem, might destabilize crisis stability, and increase inadvertent escalation risk. 
 The article highlights three critical features of inadvertent escalation risk in the 
emerging AI-nuclear strategic nexus. First, while nuclear-armed states have a shared 
interest in avoiding nuclear war (expressed by the “rational deterrence theory”), they also 
place a high value on their nuclear forces, which advanced conventional weapons 
enhanced by AI technology inadvertently threaten – especially in asymmetric military 
situations. The synthesis of AI technology into conventional weapon systems to enhance 
autonomy, remote sensing, missile guidance, and situational awareness creates new 
tactical possibilities for a range of novel destabilizing conventional counterforce 
possibilities (e.g., cyberattacks on NC3 and locating survivable nuclear retaliatory 
capabilities). In regional asymmetric crisis or conflict, AI-powered tools to find, track, 
and destroy a state’s nuclear forces may be viewed by the other side as a precursor to a 
disabling counterforce attack, thus increasing incentives to escalate a conventional 
situation inadvertently. Further, these technological developments have been 
accompanied by destabilizing doctrinal shifts by several regional nuclear powers (Russia, 
North Korea, and possibly China), compounding the problem of commingled dual-use 
conventional and nuclear weapons missions at a strategic level. 
 Second, escalatory rhetoric and other aggressive behavior, amplified by the digital 
information ecosystem, might be misperceived as unprovoked malign intent – not as a 
response to the initiator's behavior – leading to action and reaction spirals of potentially 
irrevocable inadvertent escalation. Cognitive and heuristic burdens caused by information 
overload and complexity will likely make decision-makers more susceptible to cognitive 
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bias, misperceptions, and heuristics to approach complex problem-solving. Also, new AI-
enhanced tools are enabling a more comprehensive range of actors (state and non-state) 
with asymmetric techniques (e.g., dis/misinformation and cyber-attacks) to improve their 
bargaining hand by delegitimizing (or legitimizing) the use of nuclear weapons during an 
escalating situation – or suing for peace or de-escalating a situation. The study also 
demonstrates the impact of escalatory rhetoric in the information ecosystem could be a 
double-edged sword for inadvertent escalation risk at the political decision-making level. 
On the one hand, public rhetorical escalation can mobilize domestic support and signal 
deterrence and resolve to an adversary, thus making war less likely. On the other hand, 
sowing public fear, distrust, and threatening a leader’s reputation and image domestically 
can inadvertently make enemies of unresolved actors. 
 Third, and related, the state of heightened tension, uncertainty, complexity, and 
compressed decision-making (or "the fog of war") of modern digitized warfare will likely 
be dramatically increased with AI technology's infusion. That is, restricting the options 
and time available for de-escalation, compounding the problem of offense-defense 
distinguishability, and increasing the risks of both horizontal and vertical inadvertent 
escalation. Moreover, the increasing dependencies and concomitant vulnerabilities on 
digital technologies (especially AI) and information to conduct modern warfare create a 
new security paradox. This "paradox" could create resource vulnerabilities that generate 
first strike and pre-emption incentives, predicated upon "use it or lose it" pressures, 
whether real or illusory. 
 In today’s nuclear multipolar world with great power techno-military competition 
(US-China and US-Russia) and regional asymmetric dynamics there is a political 
imperative to address the challenges for inadvertent escalation by engaging in broader 
strategic stability talks about the development of new and innovative normative 
frameworks.154  Multipolarity – a function of political relations – exacerbates techno-
military competition, which in turn, has important implications for strategic stability, 
deterrence, the security dilemma, and escalation dynamics described in this article. 
Against the backdrop of increasing populism, amplified and manipulated in the digital 
information ecosystem, long-term regional and global stability and nuclear security efforts 
will continue to be jettisoned in favor of short-termism, asymmetric and great power 
competition, political fragmentation, and asymmetric and great power competition – to 
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gain the “first-mover advantages” in areas such as AI, hypersonic weapons, and 
information warfare.155  
 When the problem arises because of technological creativity, and compliance and 
verification are concerned with abstaining from future breakthroughs and potential uses 
of AI, technological solutions are unlikely to be an adequate response – that is, the process 
is not reducible to structural processes and assumptions of ‘rational’ actors, agency 
matters.156 Therefore, any solution to the emerging AI-nuclear strategic challenge must 
be a much a political as a technological one. Solutions will have to help adversaries 
“escape an irrational situation where it is precisely rational [decision-making] behavior 
that may be most dangerous” – reducing perceived vulnerability in the short-term at the 
expense of future inadvertent risk.157  
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